China's Life Satisfaction, 1990-2010 * Despite its unprecedented growth in output per capita in the last two decades, China has essentially followed the life satisfaction trajectory of the central and eastern European transition countries -a U-shaped swing and a nil or declining trend. There is no evidence of an increase in life satisfaction of the magnitude that might have been expected to result from the fourfold improvement in the level of per capita consumption that has occurred. As in the European countries, in China the trend and U-shaped pattern appear to be related to a pronounced rise in unemployment followed by a mild decline, and an accompanying dissolution of the social safety net along with growing income inequality. The burden of worsening life satisfaction in China has fallen chiefly on the lowest socioeconomic groups. An initially highly egalitarian distribution of life satisfaction has been replaced by an increasingly unequal one, with decreasing life satisfaction in persons in the bottom third of the income distribution and increasing life satisfaction in those in the top third.
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The purpose of this article is chiefly to describe the trend in subjective well--being (SWB) during China's transition from socialism to capitalism and the differences in SWB by socio--economic status. In support of the findings on subjective well--being, we also note likely causal factors, drawing on evidence for both China and the European transition countries.
There are many who believe that well--being is increased by economic growth, and that the higher the growth rate, the greater the increase in well--being.
There could hardly be a better country than China to test these expectations of increased well--being. China's transition has been marked by perhaps the highest two--decade rate of growth in gross domestic product (GDP) per capita ever seen, a remarkable 8 percent per year or more * (1) . Between 1990 and 2009 per capita consumption in China (in constant dollar terms) multiplied four--fold.
The principal measure of well--being used here is self--reported feelings of satisfaction with life, one of the measures recommended in the recent Stiglitz--Sen--Fitoussi Report (7):
All things considered, how satisfied are you with your life as a whole these days? Please use this card to help with your answer.
1 'Dissatisfied' 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 'Satisfied'.
Previous Studies
Earlier work offers mixed results -from life satisfaction "falling" to "constant" to "rising." On the downtrend side there is an article by Brockmann et al * Output statistics in this paper are from the Penn World Table  ( pwt.econ.upenn.edu/cic_main.html).
(8).
Kahneman and Krueger's (9) reading of the evidence tends toward "constant,"
but "declining" is also viewed as within the realm of possibility. Two Gallup reports offer a "flat line" conclusion (10, 11) , as does a study by Knight and Gunatilaka (12) .
The basis of the Knight--Gunatilaka conclusion is an earlier collaborative article by one of the current authors (13) . A recent report of the PEW Research Center sees China as experiencing rising life satisfaction along with rising incomes † .
Studies of life satisfaction by Chinese scholars are growing in number, but focus on point--of--time differences (16) . One of China's premier survey organizations, Horizon Research Consultancy Group, has conducted a number of valuable quality of life surveys that include questions on life satisfaction. These data are reported in the "Blue Books" issued annually by the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (17), but there is virtually no discussion of longer term movements.
Data and Methods
The life satisfaction data used here are from six surveys conducted by five different survey organizations and span various segments of the 1990--2010 period ‡ .
Most of the surveys ask about overall life satisfaction, but several refer to roughly equivalent concepts such as "happiness" or "ladder of life". options (see Supporting Information); hence we examine the surveys individually rather than pooling the data. The survey dates are typically intermittent (only two surveys include annual data), so we focus on the longer--term movement during the two decades. Sample sizes run from around 1,000 to over 5,000 respondents, with most surveys above 2,500.
Most of the surveys tend to be disproportionately urban (such as the PEW and Asiabarometer surveys). But economic growth is also disproportionately urban during this period, with urban incomes rising markedly relative to rural (17, 18, 19 of China. It is the task of the economic historian to find these pieces of data, and see if they can be put together to form a coherent picture. The 1990 WVS value contributes to the judgment that life satisfaction in China has not increased and may even have declined in the last two decades. But is this value credible? One reason for thinking so is that in 1990 virtually all socio--economic groups in China -from the lowest to the highest stratum -report high and fairly similar mean levels of life satisfaction, in excess of 7.0. These high levels appear throughout the distributions by education, occupation, and income. Hence, the high overall average cannot be attributed to a disproportionate representation in the survey of high life satisfaction groups.
Results

Longer
In addition, China's 1990 value of 7.29 for mean life satisfaction is virtually identical to the value (7.26) in the fragmentary pre--transition data for the Soviet Union, the country whose labor and wage policies served as the model for communist China (4, 18) . Moreover, in 1990 life satisfaction inequality in the two countries is also almost the same (Table S4) .
Confidence in the 1990 WVS data is further bolstered by the fact that the internal structure of the data set is much like that observed in happiness data sets The movement of China's unemployment rate is partly a reflection of the world economy. As noted, there was a significant slowdown in world economic growth at the start of the millennium, and countries substantially dependent on exports, such as China, felt the impact of declining foreign demand (29, 30) . More importantly, however, the movement in China's unemployment rate is a result of government policy, and symptomatic of the deterioration in the social safety net that had prevailed under socialism. China's urban labor market prior to reform has been characterized as an "iron rice bowl" and "mini welfare state" (18) .
As was mentioned, workers in state--owned--enterprises (SOEs), the firms that 13 accounted for the bulk of urban employment, had permanent jobs and an extensive employer--provided social safety net (18, 36) . From an economic point of view, this system was highly inefficient and lacked incentives, but it ensured that urban workers had income security, and was highly egalitarian.
In 14 Second is a decline in the proportion of employed persons in the working age population due to a substantial drop in the labor force participation rate of women and older workers (4, 43) . Third, in China as in Europe, the social safety net was greatly diminished with the transition to free market conditions. A recent World
Bank report (44) (4), and parallels closely the trend in Russia.
Although incomes have increased for all income groups, China's transition has been marked by a sharp increase in income inequality (18, 46--48) . The rise in income inequality is due to the growing urban--rural disparity in income, increased income differences within both urban and rural areas, and the sharp increase of unemployment in urban areas associated with restructuring (48). Knight and Song While the population's health status was improving, a rising number of people were priced out of treatment or fell into poverty because of health care costs."
Summary and Implication
Despite an unprecedented rate of economic growth, China's life satisfaction in the last two decades has largely followed the trajectory of the central and eastern
European transition countries -a decline followed by a recovery, with a nil or declining trend over the period as a whole. There is no evidence of a marked Moreover, there is more to life satisfaction than material goods; there is home life and the need for secure jobs to support it, health, friends and relatives, and the like. It is possible that the lack of a marked uptrend in overall life satisfaction in China may reflect an adverse impact on life satisfaction of changes in factors like these, as has been true of the transition experience of East Germany, for which such detailed data are available (4).
A common assertion based on point--of--time comparisons of nations, is that at low levels of GDP per capita, economic growth raises life satisfaction but beyond some point this effect diminishes (25--27, 58) . It would be hard to find a better historical test of this than China, where the material living level has demonstrably soared in the last two decades from a very low initial level. Yet China's experience
demonstrates once again what has been shown before (4, 13, 15, 60) : the cross section relationship of life satisfaction to GDP per capita is a poor and misleading predictor of actual historical experience.
In policy circles there has recently been growing attention to subjective well--being as a complement or alternative to GDP per capita as a measure of well--being.
There could hardly be a more dramatic example than China to test the comparative significance of the two measures. What the GDP measure is registering is the spectacular improvement that has taken place, on average, in material living conditions. The measure of life satisfaction is demonstrating, in contrast, that among ordinary people, especially the less--educated and lower income segments of the population, life satisfaction has declined noticeably as material aspirations have soared and concerns have arisen about such critical matters as finding and holding a job, reliable and affordable health care, and provision for children and the elderly. 
